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Central to Descartes’ philosophy is a view about immutable essences and eternal 
truths. After mentioning a Platonist account of recollection in Meditation V, 
Descartes declares that the ideas we have of mathematical notions “are not my 
invention but have their own true and immutable natures” (AT VII, 64/CSM II, 
44).1 Descartes claims that other important philosophical notions, such as God, 
mind, body, and human free will (AT VII, 68; AT VIII-2, 348; AT III, 383; AT 
VII, 433, respectively), also have immutable natures or essences. Although 
Descartes says a good many things about this view, nowhere does he offer 
definitive doctrine on the matter, and in fact frequently confuses his reader with 
apparently inconsistent pronouncements about immutable natures and eternal 
truths. In this essay, I focus on the immutable natures and propose a solution to 
two of the main problems associated with Descartes’ position, the metaphysical 
status of immutable natures and the purported indivisibility of their existence as 
ideas in the mind. My analysis seeks to show that essences are metaphysically 
atomistic insofar as they are the products of God’s immutable will and have their 
eternal ontological residence in God’s understanding. The ideas that represent 
these essences in the human mind are indivisible atoms of thought. My contention is 
that the neglect of this symmetrical atomism, rooted in the structure of Cartesian 
ideas, has caused interpretive misunderstanding with respect to the simplicity of 
innate ideas and the ontological status of immutable natures. Although my focus 
                                                 
1 References to Descartes will be abbreviated as follows: AT: Descartes 1974-1989; CSM: Descartes 
1984-1985; CSMK: Descartes 1991. I primarily use Cottingham et al., but I occasionally modify the 
translation. In these cases, I note it in the text and provide the original in brackets. 
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will be on immutable essences, Descartes’ discussion of the eternal truths is a 
closely related matter that will be consulted. My strategy in this paper will be as 
follows. In the first section, I will begin by outlining how innate ideas represent 
immutable natures. In doing so, I will have to explain why Descartes claims that 
such ideas are simple and indivisible, which has proved puzzling to recent 
commentators. The key to solving this puzzle turns out to be Descartes’ somewhat 
unusual understanding of simplicity as the inseparability of component properties. 
This indivisibility is also grounded in the mind-and-world-independence of the 
immutable natures as they exist in formal reality. With the basics of this dual 
atomism established, in the second section I shall refine this interpretation by 
working through the deficiencies and worthwhile advances in the relevant recent 
scholarship concerning the ontological status of immutable natures. Several 
significant paradoxes arise out of the interpretation I have put forward, and I 
devote the third and final section to resolving these. 
 
1. The Dual Structure of Ideas: Metaphysical Atoms and Atoms of Thought 
In order to countenance Descartes’ doctrine of immutable natures, we must first 
highlight several relevant aspects of his more general theory of ideas. Descartes 
uses the term “idea” in a variety of different ways, yet our focus is on ideas that 
are representational, innate, and indivisible. As to the first aspect, Descartes writes that 
“some of my thoughts are as it were the images of things [rerum imagines], and it is 
only in these cases that the term ‘idea’ is strictly appropriate” (AT VII, 37/CSM II, 
25). Descartes employs scholastic terminology in an attempt to clarify how it is 
that ideas are paradigmatically representational. For example, in the “Preface to the 
Reader” of the Meditations, he writes: “‘Idea’ can be taken materially, as an operation 
of the intellect, in which case it cannot be said to be more perfect than me. 
Alternatively, it can be taken objectively, as the thing represented [repraesentata] by 
that operation” (AT VII, 8/CSM II, 7). In other places, he labels the “material” 
aspect of ideas their “formal reality” (AT VII, 41/CSM II, 28-29). We need not 
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wade through the complexities involved with this view here2; it is sufficient to 
indicate the basic structure of ideas in so far as they are of or about things (“for 
example, when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God” 
[AT VII, 37/CSM II, 25]). An idea can be understood materially or formally as a 
mode of my thinking, as well as objectively as the object represented in my mind. 
Ideas in the material or formal sense derive their degree of reality from the mind 
itself, and are all equivalent in this regard. The reality of an idea in the objective 
sense, on the other hand, depends on the thing that is being represented. This gives 
rise to significant differences between ideas with respect to their representational 
contents. 
There is another important way that Descartes classifies ideas: “Among my 
ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious, and others to have been 
invented by me” (AT VII, 37-38/CSM II, 26). Adventitious ideas appear to come 
from things external to us, while inventions of the mind are put together out of 
materials already in our minds (from the senses, etc.). Adventitious ideas act as a 
connection to the external world and have an important role in Descartes’ physics, 
yet none of the clear and distinct aspects of material nature are actually derived 
from our particular experiences of external things, but are innate in us (AT VII, 
43-44; AT VIII-2, 358-359). Ideas that are composed by the mind itself do not 
necessarily represent real things, since they may be arbitrarily constructed out of 
elements that do not belong together. This leaves only innate ideas, “such as the 
idea of God, mind, body, triangle, and in general all those which represent true, 
immutable and eternal essences” (AT III, 383/CSMK, 183). Thus, we see that 
innate ideas are our only means of access to the immutable and eternal natures. 
Taking this fact as our starting point, we must now clarify the immutability and 
eternality of such essences. To do so, it will be helpful to first ascertain the nature 
of ideas that represent immutable essences as indivisible. This corresponds to ideas 
in their objective reality; this will then serve as a guideline for understanding the 
                                                 
2 For discussions of the scholastic background to Descartes’ theory of ideas, see Wells 1984; 1993; and 
Ariew 2011, ch. 3. For more focused discussion of Descartes’ view on the issue, see Chappell 1986 and 
Nadler 2006. For a more general treatment of ideas in the seventeenth century, see Ayers 1998. 
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formal nature of immutable essences per se. I will argue that innate ideas are atoms 
of thought, while the eternal and immutable essences are metaphysically atomistic. 
Descartes clarifies his distinction between ideas that represent immutable 
essences and those that are invented by the mind in several places. Ideas of the 
former sort have the characteristic of simplicity or indivisibility that makes it 
impossible for the mind to break them into parts, as explained in his Reply to 
Caterus: 
We must notice a point about ideas which do not contain true and immutable natures but 
merely ones which are invented and put together by the intellect. Such ideas can always be 
split up by the same intellect, not simply by an abstraction but by a clear and distinct 
intellectual operation, so that any ideas which the intellect cannot split up in this way were 
clearly not put together by the intellect. (AT VII, 117/CSM II, 83-84) 
Ideas of triangles or squares cannot be divided into simpler parts and thus 
represent immutable natures; composite ideas of winged horses or existing lions, 
on the other hand, can be broken down into their component parts “by a clear and 
distinct intellectual operation” and thereby do not represent immutable natures. 
Descartes furthers his explanation in the Reply to Gassendi: 
When you attack my statement that nothing can be added to or taken away from the idea 
of God, it seems that you have paid no attention to the common philosophical maxim 
that the essences of things are indivisible. An idea represents the essence of a thing, and if 
anything is added to or taken away from the essence, then the idea automatically becomes 
the idea of something else. (AT VII, 371/CSM II, 255-256)3 
Here the simplicity of immutable essences includes not only the 
aforementioned indivisibility, but also that nothing can be added to such an idea 
without transforming it into something else. Contemporary readers of Descartes 
have found this view confounding, to say the least.4 Descartes uses geometrical 
notions as his primary examples to illustrate his position. Yet if we analyze the idea 
                                                 
3 Eustachius’ Summa philosophiae quadrapartita would have been fresh in Descartes’ mind, as he had read 
it the previous year (AT VII, 232). “The common philosophical maxim” that Descartes mentions is 
found in Eustachius 1609, Metaphysics, Second Part, Discourse II, Question II. See also Suarez 1877, 
Disputation XLVI, Sectio I, §12-14. 
4 For example, see Wilson 1978, 172-174; and Curley 1978, 147-155. 
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we have of a triangle, it does not appear to be indivisible to the human mind. For 
one can break it apart into simpler components such as “three-sided” and 
“polygon.” Is Descartes’ view hopelessly incoherent or have his readers 
misunderstood him? 
Although I do think Descartes’ position is somewhat problematic, I also 
believe that he has been misinterpreted on this point, as many of those who find 
these passages troubling have read Descartes from a twentieth-century perspective 
concerned with a notion of analyticity that is at odds with his stated aims.5 
Descartes was the first to recognize that even ideas representing immutable 
essences are often complex notions involving multiple characteristics. In the Second 
Replies, he reminds his reader to “examine the ideas of those natures which contain 
a combination of many attributes, such as the nature of a triangle, or of a square, 
or of any other figure” (AT VII, 163/CSM II, 115).6 From this text, we can infer 
that Descartes does not understand the simplicity of the immutable natures to be 
a logical, formal, or semantic property. If this were the case, then there would be 
no reason to think of triangles or other figures as indivisible. It is better to follow 
Descartes’ lead when he identifies simplicity not with a lack of parts, but with an 
inseparability of attributes. For example, Descartes tries to head off confusion with 
regard to God’s nature as both simple and containing many attributes as follows: 
“On the contrary, the unity, the simplicity, or the inseparability [unitas, simplicitas, 
sive inseparabilitas] of all the attributes of God is one of the most important 
perfections which I understand him to have” (AT VII, 50/CSM II, 34). We can 
apply this meaning of simplicity to the idea of a triangle to see that its various 
attributes are connected together such that the mind cannot clearly and distinctly 
separate them. 
                                                 
5 Margaret Wilson focused her efforts on criteria of “unforeseen and unwilled consequences” (1978, 
172) and “unanalyzability” (174). Her analysis of the second criterion is particularly misleading, as she 
fails to appreciate Descartes’ more nuanced view of simplicity, which will be explained presently. For a 
helpful rejoinder to Wilson’s commentary, see Schmaltz 2014, 212-213. 
6 Similarly, Descartes appears to accept Gassendi’s characterization of geometrical figures as being both 
“indivisible” and yet composed out of elements such as points, lines, and planes, even if he disagrees 
with the conclusions Gassendi draws from this claim (AT VII, 380-381). 
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The quality of indivisibility is one that Descartes consistently employs with 
respect to the mind’s apprehension of an idea in the objective sense. Thus, innate 
ideas that represent immutable natures are atoms of thought: human thinking is 
rationally incapable of dividing notions such as triangle, will, and God into more 
basic components without fundamentally altering their meanings. If immutable 
natures represented as ideas in the mind are not logically or even semantically 
atomic, then it is worth considering what exactly enables us to consider them atoms 
of thought. There are two factors at work. First, Descartes thinks that the rational 
intuition of essences and simple truths is not merely an understanding of stipulated 
definitions (e.g. that all bachelors are unmarried) or a recognition of what is 
logically obvious (e.g. that unmarried men are unmarried). These unhelpful 
formalisms are at the heart of the scholastic syllogism, which Descartes finds 
largely useless. The simplicity of immutable natures instead involves intuiting 
essences whose attributes are inseparably bound; it is a core feature of the human 
intellect that it apprehends certain notions as indivisible, while others do not enjoy 
this status.7 This point has been met with criticism because it has been analyzed 
independently of its divine foundation. Yet, without taking this ground into 
account, the distinction between composite constructions and immutable natures 
begins to appear arbitrary.8 
                                                 
7 Perhaps one will still feel as though Descartes has not adequately justified his belief that certain 
notions (God, triangle, body, etc.) have true and immutable natures that are understood as indivisible 
ideas in the mind, while other notions (hippogriff, existing lion, etc.) are composite inventions, whose 
various characteristics can be legitimately broken apart by the mind. It seems to me that the force of his 
distinction stands or falls with the clarity and distinctness with which one perceives the inseparability of 
properties in a true and immutable nature, but not in a composite invention. Thus Descartes is forced 
to appeal to one’s intuition that there is a complex of properties (interior angles add to two right angles, 
largest angle is opposite the largest side, etc.) that are inseparably connected with the basic notion of a 
three-sided polygon. This same rational intuition does not appear to hold when considering the 
property of existence in conjunction with the idea of a lion. 
8 This should not be surprising, as Descartes admits that the ultimate reasons for God making the 
essences of things the way they are is “unintelligible to us” (AT VII, 436/CSM II, 294). In making 
things so, God did not appeal to independent reasons, but was utterly indifferent. Therefore, we are 
unable to give an explanation, independent of God’s will, for why our intellect will perceive certain 
collections of properties as inseparably bound and not others. It is helpful to recall the priority 
Descartes places on intuition over deduction in the Regulae (AT X, 368-370). 
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Walter Edelberg has devised a sophisticated solution to clear Descartes of the 
philosophical difficulties his position seems to imply (1990). Edelberg suggests we 
understand immutable natures by way of their “topical entailments,” such that a 
triangle’s definitional properties conjoined with axiomatic geometrical principles 
will entail properties such as its interior angles adding to two right angles. This 
procedure can thus work with other types of natures, whose entailments are instead 
metaphysical, mental, or theological. These entailments are not merely logical or 
analytic, since the original definitions and laws of logic are not—individually or 
jointly—sufficient for inferring a nature’s additional properties. While this 
proposal does avoid most of the problems associated with compositionality 
mentioned above, it does not help us make sense of Descartes’ own 
argumentation. For Descartes does not favor a mechanical strategy of inference 
from definitions, axioms, and logical laws to draw out the unexpected properties 
of a nature.9 Perhaps this method could prove helpful as ex post facto clarification, 
but it may obscure our rational apprehension of the true natures of things.10 
From the foregoing, we can conclude that atoms of thought derive their 
simplicity entirely from the inseparability of their component properties, which can 
only be perceived through clear and distinct intuition. It is on the basis of these 
atoms of thought that all demonstration in mathematics, science, or metaphysics 
depends. However, we have not yet clarified the ultimate ground that guarantees 
the veracity of the clear and distinct intuition of simple ideas, as we have only 
                                                 
9 See Descartes’ reluctance to set his Meditations out in this fashion in the Second Replies (AT VII, 155-
159). 
10 This is not intended to be a critique of Edelberg’s paper, as he makes this point himself (Edelberg 
1990, 505-506), and accepts that his interpretation may only amount to an “extensional equivalence” 
with Descartes’ position. Tad Schmaltz has recently proposed a solution that builds off of Edelberg’s 
model. He claims that “properties can reveal that a nature is immutable only if they derive from that 
nature solely in virtue of the principal attribute to which that nature is referred” (Schmaltz 2014, 213-
214). This is an interesting hypothesis that would indeed solve some of Descartes’ issues concerning 
constructed and immutable natures. However, Schmaltz does not marshal any textual evidence on 
behalf of his claim, and while his proposal does appear to work for geometrical figures, it is less clear 
how it might work for other natures. How might one derive the immutable nature of doubt from the 
nature of thought (the principal attribute of mental substance)? It would be even more difficult to see 




considered immutable natures from the side of the mind perceiving them. In order 
to do so, we must ascertain the metaphysical nature of that which is represented 
by innate ideas, i.e. the immutable and eternal essences as they exist in formal 
reality. This dual structure of immutable natures as both mental representation and 
metaphysical entity represented is indicated by the structure of ideas in the 
objective sense. In a famous passage from Meditation V, Descartes discusses the 
entities that are represented by innate ideas: 
I find within me countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist anywhere 
outside me [etiam si extra me fortasse nullibi existant] still cannot be called nothing; for although 
in a sense they can be thought of at will, they are not my invention but have their own 
true and immutable natures. When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps no 
such figure exists, or has ever existed, anywhere outside my thought, there is still a 
determinate nature, or essence, or form of the triangle which is immutable and eternal, 
and not invented by me or dependent on my mind. This is clear from the fact that various 
properties can be demonstrated of the triangle, for example that its three angles equal two 
right angles, that its greatest side subtends its greatest angle, and the like; and since these 
properties are ones which I now clearly recognize whether I want to or not, even if I never 
thought of them at all when I previously imagined the triangle, it follows that they cannot 
have been invented by me. (AT VII, 64/CSM II, 44-45) 
There are a few important things to draw attention to in this text. Descartes 
indicates that there is some “nature, or essence, or form” that has some sort of 
being independent of my mind. Although he says that figures such as triangles may 
potentially have no existence outside his mind, I think he means to contrast the 
kind of existence ideas have with the kind of existence external, material bodies 
have. In writing “they may not exist anywhere outside me [etiam si extra me fortasse 
nullibi existant]” and later in Meditation V “outside my thought [extra cogitationem 
meam]” (AT VII, 37-39) Descartes is employing language that echoes texts from 
Meditation III (which repeatedly include the phrase “extra me”) where he is more 
clear about distinguishing inner, mental existence from outer, material existence.11 
So, if objects such as triangles may not exist anywhere in the world, but their 
                                                 
11 It should also be noted that the French translation of Meditation V reads “anywhere in the world 
outside my thought [aucun lieu du monde hors de ma pensée]” (AT IX-1, 51), which corroborates my own 
reading of the text. 
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essences “still cannot be called nothing,” there must be some way these essences 
exist independent of the mind.12 Whatever kind of entity this turns out to be will 
be the thing that is represented in the objective content of an innate idea. 
In order to fully appreciate Descartes’ underlying reasons for considering true 
and immutable natures both mentally indivisible and metaphysically immutable, 
we must investigate the closely related notion of the creation of the eternal truths.13 
In his letters to Mersenne of 1630, he explains that God’s will is the ultimate reason 
why the eternal truths are true and the immutable natures immutable: 
The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and depend 
on him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures. [...] It is God who has laid down these 
laws in nature just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom. [...] They are all inborn in our 
minds just as a king would imprint his laws on the hearts of all his subjects if he had 
enough power to do so. (AT I, 145/CSMK, 23) 
We have discussed the way that innate ideas exist in human minds. We now 
see that the independence of the true and immutable natures (from the human 
intellect) derives from the power of God’s will. Likewise, the indivisibility of 
essences as inseparability of components finds its basis in God. Descartes’ startling 
first pronouncement of this doctrine undoubtedly evoked probing questions from 
Mersenne about the nature of the eternal truths. 
There are two other important passages from this series of correspondence 
to which we should call attention. The first comes from the letter of May 6, 1630: 
                                                 
12 Of course, there are other texts that appear to directly contradict this reading. In Principles I.48, 
Descartes says that eternal truths “have no existence outside our thought” (AT VIII-1, 22/CSM I, 208). 
These issues will be dealt with in the next section. 
13 Descartes appears to understand the true and immutable natures and the eternal truths in much the 
same way (AT I, 152), as many commentators have pointed out (Schmaltz 1991; Chappell 1997; Nolan 
1997; Rozemond 2008). I believe there is a difference between the two, as Descartes mentions that “I 
do not think that the essences of things and the mathematical truths which can be known of them are 
independent of God” (AT VII, 380/CSM II, 261). This implies that essences or natures are known 
immediately by the intellect, while truths are based on these essences. In Meditation III, Descartes 
distinguishes ideas, which “cannot, properly speaking, be false” (AT VII, 37/CSM II, 26) from 
judgements, which are the bearers of truth and falsity. Admittedly, Descartes is not altogether clear on 
this issue, since at a different point he appears to say that truth might also be a correspondence of idea 
and essence (AT II, 597). See Hattab 2016, 212-214 for discussion of this issue. For our purposes, the 
remarks Descartes makes concerning the creation of the eternal truths apply equally well to the creation 
of the true and immutable natures. 
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If men really understood the sense of their words they could never say without blasphemy 
that the truth of anything is prior to the knowledge which God has of it. In God willing 
and knowing are a single thing in such a way that by the very fact of willing something he 
knows it and it is only for this reason that such a thing is true. (AT I, 149/CSMK, 24) 
This text alludes to Descartes’ position on the long-standing theological issue 
of divine simplicity. Whatever else Descartes may say about God’s simplicity, we 
see here his unequivocal identification of God’s will and understanding.14 Thus if 
the eternal truths and natures exist as free and creative decrees from God, they 
simultaneously exist as items of God’s understanding. This form of existence in 
God’s understanding is the formal reality to which our ideas objectively aim. The 
final passage occurs in the letter of May 27, 1630: 
And it is certain that these truths are no more necessarily attached to [God’s] essence than 
are other created things. You ask what God did in order to produce them. I reply that 
from all eternity he willed and understood them to be, and by that very fact he created 
them. Or, if you reserve the word created for the existence of things, then he established 
them and made them. (AT I, 152-153/CSMK, 25) 
Much recent scholarship has explained the background debate to which 
Descartes implicitly refers in the first sentence of the above text. Descartes most 
clearly disagrees with Thomas Aquinas, who held that eternal truths and natures 
existed as part of God’s essence, and were not a result of God’s will as creatures 
are. It is, of course, important not to identify God with his creatures and Aquinas’ 
doctrine is a simple way of accomplishing this, while Descartes’ is not.15 Note, 
however, that Descartes seems to think of the eternal truths and natures as a 
different sort of creation than that of the “existence of things.” At the same time, 
Descartes made it clear in the first letter that the creation of eternal truths and 
natures was just like that of creatures (AT I, 145). How can we make sense of this 
tension? 
                                                 
14 This view was one Descartes maintained throughout his career, as evidenced by nearly identical 
comments in a letter to Mesland of 1644 (AT IV, 119). 
15 There were a host of different solutions to this problem in Hellenistic, medieval, and scholastic 
thought, though it is unnecessary for our purposes to give an exhaustive analysis of such views. See 




2. A Consideration of Recent Scholarship Concerning Immutable Natures and Eternal Truths 
We have mostly completed our analysis of Descartes’ atomism of thought, but we 
still must show how this doctrine fits coherently into Descartes’ overall system, 
given the above-noted tension. It will be helpful at this point to go through several 
important scholarly interpretations of Descartes’ view of the eternal truths and 
immutable natures. One classic interpretation comes from Anthony Kenny, who 
argues that Descartes is the “founder of modern Platonism” (Kenny 1970, 692-
693). He takes the letters to Mersenne of 1630 and the opening passages of 
Meditation V to indicate that the eternal truths are distinct from God (though not 
independent) and independent of human minds and other existing things. Eternal 
truths must be independent of God, since they are causal effects of God’s will 
(Cause X and Effect Y cannot be identical). When Descartes claims of a figure 
such as a triangle that “perhaps no such figure exists, or has ever existed,” yet 
nevertheless the triangle has an essence that is “not invented by me or dependent 
on my mind” (AT VII, 64/CSM II, 45), Kenny takes this to mean that the eternal 
truths and natures exist in a way that is akin to Platonic forms. This interpretation 
has been roundly criticized for attributing to Descartes a type of being that is 
explicitly disallowed in his ontology (Schmaltz 1991; Nolan 1997; Chappell 1997; 
Cunning 2003). 
I think these criticisms are clearly correct and that there is no way to conceive 
of Descartes as a radical Platonist in this sense. However, Kenny emphasizes one 
point worth consideration. Reiterating his comments from Meditation V, in the 
Sixth Replies Descartes declares that “we should not suppose that eternal truths 
‘depend on the human intellect or on other existing things’” (AT VII, 436/CSM 
II, 294). Commentators have warned that we should take neither this claim about 
dependence nor the one from Meditation V as assertions about the ontological 
dependence of eternal truths on the human intellect or existing things. Rather, 
Descartes means to emphasize that their causal origin has its seat in God, as 
opposed to being an invention of our mind or a contingent configuration of 
matter. The emphasis on causal dependence is well taken; however, if we look 
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more closely at the context in which the above passage from the Sixth Replies 
appears, we see that this dependence simply cannot be an ontological one either: 
Again, there is no need to ask how God could have brought it about from eternity that it 
was not true that twice four make eight, and so on; for I admit this is unintelligible to us. 
Yet on the other hand I do understand, quite correctly, that there cannot be any class of 
entity that does not depend on God; I also understand that it would have been easy for 
God to ordain certain things such that we men cannot understand the possibility of their 
being otherwise than they are. (AT VII, 436/CSM II, 294) 
If the eternal truths and natures were truly created from eternity, while human 
minds and the material world have not existed from eternity, then there can be no 
ontological dependence of eternal truths and natures upon “existing things,” just 
as there can be no causal dependence either. I take this to be the meaning of 
Descartes’ claim that “there cannot be any class of entity that does not depend on 
God.”16 
This point deserves additional emphasis.17 Descartes is very careful to 
distinguish eternality from other temporal concepts like immortality and incorruptibility. 
Although he does not specifically define these terms, his use of them makes it clear 
that eternality is a notion associated with God’s sempiternal existence (“[God] has 
existed from eternity and will abide for eternity” [AT VII, 68/CSM II, 47]18), while 
the meaning of immortality is tied to the unending future existence of the human 
soul after its beginning in time.19 Aside from being a characteristic of God’s own 
being, Descartes employs the term “eternal” (aeternus/eternel) to refer exclusively to 
God’s decrees and the eternal truths and essences that are the result of such 
decrees. Consider two texts that indicate the differ ence between eternality and 
immortality. Embedded in remarks concerning God’s self-causation in the First 
                                                 
16 Cf. AT VII, 380. My reading here should be compared with Nolan’s (1997, section 4) and De Rosa’s 
(2011, 612). 
17 Rozemond (2008, 46) mentions the importance of eternality, but does not explore the topic; De Rosa 
(2011) and Hattab (2016) both investigate the philosophical implications of understanding truths and 
essences to be eternal, but do not analyse Descartes’ specific use of the term. 
18 See also AT VII, 119; AT VIII-1, 10, 13. 
19 Nearly every time Descartes uses the term “immortal” (immortalis/immortel) he is referring to the 
immortality of the human soul (e.g. AT VI, 60; AT I, 182; AT III, 266, 297). Any other uses of the term 
are philosophically insignificant (e.g. AT IV, 202; AT VIII-2, 244). 
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Replies, Descartes begins a conditional statement by writing, “if I had existed from 
eternity, and thus nothing had existed prior to myself, [...]” (AT VII, 109/CSM II, 
79) thereby equating eternity with time that stretches back to an infinite degree. An 
even better indication of this fact comes in a letter to Chanut of 1647, in which 
Descartes writes that “no one infers from the infinite duration which the world 
must have in the future that it must have been created from all eternity” (AT V, 
53/CSMK, 320). The clear implication of this statement is that the temporal status 
of eternity is reserved for beings that have always existed and will always exist, as 
opposed to those immortal or incorruptible ones (such as the world and human 
souls), which have not always existed. Descartes unfailingly designates the 
immutable essences and truths as eternal, meaning that their primary ontological 
place cannot be in the human soul or in the world, since these beings do not have 
the required temporal duration to sustain eternality.20 
These latter concerns doom two recent strands of interpretation. The first 
strand is spearheaded by Vere Chappell (1997) and Lawrence Nolan (1997), and 
subsequently defended by John Abbruzzese (2007). These authors contend that 
the eternal truths and natures exist objectively as ideas in the human mind. The 
key text is Principles I.48, where Descartes writes: “All the objects of our perception 
we regard either as things, or affections of things, or else as eternal truths which 
have no existence outside our thought” (AT VIII-1, 22/CSM I, 208). Descartes 
appears to be very clear in stating that the eternal truths have their ontological 
place in human thought and nowhere else. How can we reconcile this assertion 
with our findings from the Sixth Replies and associated texts concerning eternality? 
If one looks more closely at the phrase “eternal truths which have no 
existence outside our thought [aeternas veritates, nullam existentiam extra cogitationem 
nostram habentes],” it becomes apparent that the meaning is not necessarily that all 
                                                 
20 It should also be noted that Descartes employs the term “immutable” (immutabilis/immuable) almost 
exclusively to refer to God (AT III, 649; AT IV, 314; AT VI, 35; AT VIII-1, 61-63, 66; AT XI, 38, 43), 
to God’s will and decrees (AT V, 166; AT XI, 438-440), and of course to eternal natures or essences 
(especially Meditation V, First Replies, and Fifth Replies). Occasionally Descartes uses the term to refer to 
firm conviction or knowledge in the human mind (AT VII, 145, 146; AT VII, 428) or in non-
philosophical ways (AT IV, 490). None of these latter cases carry significance for Descartes’ general use 
of the term. 
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eternal truths are such that they do not have extra-mental existence, but that only 
those that were not already classified as things or affections of things.21 It is 
noteworthy that Descartes lists only the following as examples of this type of 
eternal truth in the next aphorism: 
Everything in the preceding list we regard either as a thing or as a quality or mode of a 
thing. But when we recognize that it is impossible for anything to come from nothing, the 
proposition Nothing comes from nothing is regarded not as a really existing thing, or even 
as a mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth which resides within our mind. Such truths 
are termed common notions or axioms. The following are examples of this class: It is 
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time; What is done cannot 
be undone; He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks; and countless others.22 
Normally in discussions of the eternal truths and immutable natures 
Descartes references mathematical examples about triangles or simple arithmetic 
as paradigm cases. Here he instead mentions the kinds of empty logical principle 
he finds otiose in metaphysical investigations: 
It is one thing to look for a common notion so clear and so general that it can serve as a 
principle for proving the existence of all the beings, or entities, to be discovered later; and 
another thing to look for a being whose existence is known to us better than that of any 
other, so that it can serve as a principle for discovering them. In the first sense, it can be 
said that “It is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be at the same time” 
is a principle which can serve in general, not properly speaking to make known the 
existence of anything, but simply to confirm its truth once known, by the following 
reasoning: “It is impossible that that which is, is not; I know that such a thing is; so I know 
that it is impossible that it is not.” This is of very little importance, and makes us no better 
informed. (AT IV, 444/CSMK, 290) 
 
In the above passage, he is implicitly criticizing the Aristotelian maxim that 
the law of non-contradiction is the first and most certain of all principles 
(Metaphysics 1005a19-b34). For Descartes, when philosophizing correctly the first 
and most certain item of knowledge is, of course, the cogito. The law of non-
contradiction, pace Aristotle, does not actually help us in discovering the existence 
                                                 
21 The French translation indicates the same: “& l’autre, toutes les veritez ... qui ne sont rien hors de 
nostre pensée” (AT IX-2, 45). 
22 AT VIII-1, 23-24/CSM I, 209. 
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of anything. If such common notions are so unimportant, why do they appear so 
conspicuously at this juncture of the Principles? 
In order to clear up this dilemma, I think it is essential to recall Descartes’ 
initial reasons for writing the Principles of Philosophy. In 1640 Descartes was busy 
disseminating the Meditations to prominent philosophers and theologians. He was 
particularly concerned with getting the approval of the Sorbonne in order to 
solidify his defences against the impending attack from the Jesuits such as Bourdin 
(AT III, 184). This causes Descartes to request help from Mersenne in 
understanding current scholastic philosophy, since he has done little to keep up 
with the contemporary debates and scarcely remembers the authors he has read 
(AT III, 185). Mersenne apparently recommended Eustachius a Sancto Paulo to 
him, which inspired Descartes to formulate the following proposal: 
I must tell you that I have resolved to write [the principles of my philosophy] before 
leaving this country, and to publish them perhaps within a year. My plan is to write a series 
of theses which will constitute a complete textbook of my philosophy. [...] In the same 
volume I plan to have printed a textbook of traditional philosophy, perhaps Father 
Eustache’s, with notes by me at the end of each proposition. (AT III, 233/CSMK, 156-
157) 
Although Descartes did not carry his original vision of a side-by-side 
scholastic and Cartesian textbook to fruition, it is clear that he intended the 
Principles to be a teaching manual competing with those popular in the schools.23 
He thus adopts much of the scholastic terminology and style in an effort to 
improve the reception of his philosophy. 
Given this context, we should not be surprised to find principles such as the 
law of non-contradiction and other common notions being dealt with in the 
Principles. This type of logical principle played a central role in scholastic textbooks 
and thus Descartes would be remiss to fail to discuss it in his own competing 
textbook.24 Descartes claims that this type of eternal truth “is regarded not as a 
                                                 
23 See Ariew 2014. 
24 Admittedly, this did not stop Descartes from omitting many other standard topics that were 
supposed to find a place in textbooks of this sort, such as nearly all of ethics and logic. 
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really existing thing, or even as a mode of a thing” (AT VIII-1, 23/CSM I, 209) as 
opposed to other eternal truths “which I recognized clearly in connection with 
shapes, or numbers or other items relating to arithmetic or geometry, or in general 
to pure and abstract mathematics”; this latter group of eternal truths “are 
something, and not merely nothing” (AT VII, 65/CSM II, 45). I believe that 
Descartes makes this distinction because common notions are nothing more than 
empty logical principles, which do not actually refer to any existing entity. 
Nevertheless, they do have some sort of mental existence, since dialecticians make 
use of them in their (largely useless) reasoning.25 
This last point brings us to a final reason for rejecting the interpretations of 
Chappell, Nolan, and Abbruzzese. These authors hold that eternal truths and 
immutable natures exist objectively as ideas in our mind. This, of course, is true, 
as we have ideas of triangles and arithmetic truths in the mind’s eye. Yet the key 
question is whether they have any extra-mental existence in addition to their home 
in the mind. The answer is indicated in the structure of the objective reality of 
ideas. Recall that the essential feature of ideas existing objectively is that they are 
of some thing. There must be some object that is represented by the objective content 
of an idea. Now in the case of invented or adventitious ideas, our representation 
may not actually correspond with anything existing outside the mind. But in the 
case of an innate idea—and this necessarily includes ideas of eternal truths and 
immutable natures—there must be some real existent to which the idea refers. 
Thus, to say that eternal truths and natures are nothing more than objectively existing 
ideas is to violate one of Descartes’ most important tenets.26 
The second type of interpretation that falls prey to concerns regarding the 
ontological independence of eternal truths and natures on existing things is one 
                                                 
25 Descartes does, however, make it clear that “whatever is true is something; and I have already amply 
demonstrated that everything of which I am clearly aware is true” (AT VII, 65/CSM II, 45); and that 
“in the case of the common notions, there is no doubt that they are capable of being clearly and 
distinctly perceived” (AT VIII-1, 24/CSM I, 209). From these statements it follows that the common 
notions must be something. 
26 This last line of criticism should be compared with the comments Cunning makes in his two articles 




offered by David Cunning in a pair of recent articles (ibid.). Cunning contends that 
“true and immutable natures are just the objects that have those true and 
immutable natures: the true and immutable nature of God is God, and the true 
and immutable nature of a geometrical property is that property itself” (2003, 239). 
Cunning’s position easily solves one of the glaring deficiencies of the previous 
strand of interpretation: the existing thing that is indicated by the objective content 
of an idea is nothing more than an actually existing object (such as a material 
triangle or the sun burning hydrogen eight light-minutes away). Cunning’s 
interpretation captures the case of God quite accurately, since God’s essence and 
existence are identical in a way that nothing else is. Thus, when our idea of God 
refers to some immutable essence, it is nothing more than God himself. 
However, there are many other problems with Cunning’s account. His 
primary source of evidence comes from the following passage: 
Thus, when I think of the essence of a triangle, and of the existence of the same triangle, 
these two thoughts, as thoughts, even taken objectively differ modally in the strict sense 
of the term “mode”; but the case is not the same with the triangle existing outside thought, 
in which it seems manifest that essence and existence are in no way distinct. The same is 
the case with all universals. (AT IV, 350/CSMK, 280). 
This does seem to give us good reason to believe that when we have the idea 
of a mathematical essence, our idea refers to an actually existing mathematical 
figure.27 As Cunning puts it, “Descartes also holds that the true and immutable 
natures of geometrical properties are nothing more than those properties 
themselves” (2003, 240). This statement leaves open the most important questions 
concerning the ontological status of the true and immutable natures: How do these 
properties exist? Are these properties subject to the continual fluctuations of 
material substance? I can agree with Cunning (with some reservations) in saying 
that an existing triangle manifests its essence. However, is this the primary way that 
Descartes means to indicate eternality and immutability of essences? Descartes makes 
a point in Meditation V to say that these characteristics would hold of a triangle, 
                                                 
27 For an alternative critique of Cunning’s interpretation of this passage, see Doney 2005. 
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“even if perhaps no such figure exists, or has ever existed, anywhere outside my 
thought” (AT VII, 64/CSM II, 45).28 This is because these essences are in no way 
beholden to material existence; it is clearly the other way around, that material 
existence must be mathematically ordered according to the eternal truths and 
essences that exist independent of (and prior to) the created world.29 The atomistic 
property of a triangle’s immutable nature likewise cannot be captured by existing 
triangles, which are mutable and divisible. 
There are two more promising interpretations that have influenced my own 
thinking on the issue. Tad Schmaltz argues that God’s essence includes a set of 
“strong” attributes that are not the result of his free will, but also a set of “weak” 
attributes that are created, including the eternal truths and natures (1991).30 I 
believe that Schmaltz is right to locate the eternal truths and natures in God, as it 
avoids all of the problems noted above with the other important interpretations, 
while capturing the eternality and immutability of truths and essences. In addition 
to the evidence amassed above, I think it is important to reinforce the fact that 
eternal truths and immutable natures must have some existence in God’s 
understanding and will. A frequent concern with a view like Schmaltz’s is that 
locating the created truths and natures in God is akin to identifying the created 
world with God. Yet, as Schmaltz is keen to point out, Descartes makes an explicit 
distinction between “the essence of created things” and their actual existence (AT 
                                                 
28 Cunning’s reason for not reading too much into this passage is that he believes the meditator to be in 
an inadequate epistemic position in Meditation V to make claims about the ontological status of the 
true and immutable natures. This would have to wait until Meditation VI, when the meditator is 
warranted in affirming that mathematical essences exist in existing material objects. However, I think 
that Cunning is misapprehending the meditator’s epistemic situation in Meditation V. It is not that she 
is unable to assess the ontological status of essences, since many claims are in fact made there (“they 
cannot be called nothing”; “they are not my invention but have their own true and immutable natures”; 
they have a “determinate nature, or essence, or form”; “I can demonstrate various properties of these 
shapes” [AT VII, 64-65/CSM II, 44-45]). The meditator is simply not in position to say whether 
geometrical properties exist in extended material nature. Furthermore, the evidence Cunning offers 
from Meditation VI only shows that material objects conform to geometrical properties, and not that 
extension is their sole (or even primary) ontological home. 
29 My remarks here apply also to two theses consonant with Cunning’s, Funkenstein 1975 and McRae 
1991. 
30 For a more thorough treatment of Descartes’ view of God’s uncreated attributes, see Wells 1982. 
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I, 152/CSMK, 25).31 He goes even further in disambiguating the two types of 
creation in a passage we puzzled over before: “[...] if you reserve the word created for the 
existence of things, then he established [the eternal truths] and made them” (AT I, 152-
153/CSMK, 25; emphasis added ). We are now in a position to make more sense 
of this text. God made the free decision to create the world, the eternal truths, and 
the immutable essences in a single act of divine will. As we have seen, God’s will 
and understanding are identified such that this act of creation exists in God’s 
understanding. This should not be surprising, as God must surely understand both 
the world he creates and the eternal truths, essences, and laws through which it is 
fashioned.32 This is why Descartes states that “this entire universe can be said to 
be an entity originating in God’s thought, that is, an entity created by a single act 
of the divine mind” (AT VII, 134/CSM II, 97). This is a point that has never been 
satisfactorily explained on views that situate the eternal truths and essences in the 
world or in human minds. Where could these truths and essences have existed 
before the existence of the world and the inception of our immortal minds?33 The 
answer can only be in God’s understanding, and on this point, Schmaltz appears 
to have it right.34 
                                                 
31 Descartes makes this point even more clearly in the Sixth Replies (cited by Schmaltz 1991, 137): “A 
king may be called the efficient cause of a law, although the law itself is not a thing which has physical 
existence, but is merely what they call a ‘moral entity’” (AT VII, 436/CSM II, 294). 
32 In Le Monde, Descartes claims that the laws of nature would be true in any world God created (AT 
XI, 47). 
33 I thus take literally Descartes’ claim that God is the one “in whom all the treasures of wisdom and 
the sciences lie hidden” (AT VII, 53/CSM II, 37). 
34 However, there are some important flaws with Schmaltz’s account. When analyzing Descartes’ 
ontology, one recognizes that all characteristics of God must be unchanging and thus cannot be called 
modes or qualities, but only attributes. This is, presumably, why Schmaltz labels the eternal truths and 
natures as “weak” attributes, since they are only identified with God because of his will, rather than as 
core features of his essence. Aside from the fact that Descartes does not actually use this language of 
strong and weak attributes himself, it does not appear that Descartes ever allows for a difference in 
types of attributes. And in the case of God, Descartes is clear that in discussing his attributes, “any 
variation is unintelligible” (AT VIII-1, 26/CSM I, 211). Given this point, it would be strange to 
conceive of certain of God’s attributes as “weaker” or somehow lesser than any of the others. Indeed, 
as we have noted, Descartes considers God’s unity or simplicity to be a matter of “the inseparability of 




More recently, Marleen Rozemond has offered a similar account that takes 
the eternal truths and natures to be objective beings in God’s mind (2008). She 
follows Schmaltz in emphasizing significant historical precedents for her view (e.g. 
Scotus and Suarez), arguing that others had considered immutable essences to be 
products of God’s will and to have objective being in God’s mind. Her account is 
also appealing insofar as it avoids the drawbacks of the three other main types of 
interpretation, yet the direct textual evidence for her thesis is as scant as it was for 
Schmaltz. Although many other authors had discussed the objective being of 
divine ideas, Descartes never once mentions God’s understanding to be structured 
like ours, with ideas having material and objective existence. In fact, he goes out 
of his way to underscore the vast difference between God’s understanding and our 
own (AT VII, 56-57).35 Descartes even admits that “the mode of being by which a 
thing exists objectively in the intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though it may be, is 
certainly not nothing [...]” (AT VII, 41/CSM II, 29; emphasis added). If the 
objective mode of being is imperfect, then surely the supremely perfect being does 
not possess ideas of this sort. In spite of these difficulties, Rozemond’s 
interpretation does reveal one aspect of Descartes’ view that had been previously 
neglected. Most commentators have rightly emphasized the problems Descartes 
encounters with divine simplicity, particularly if the eternal truths and essences are 
taken to exist in God. Rozemond reminds us that there can be distinctions between 
different aspects of God’s being that are nothing more than distinctions of reason. 
These distinctions do not indicate any difference in reality or between modes (both 
impossible), but “only between our thoughts about God” (ibid., 55). Descartes 
discusses various faculties and attributes of God and this insight affords us a way 
                                                 
35 Similarly, in his reply to Gassendi concerning our understanding of the infinite, Descartes 
distinguishes between the way ideas exist in the human mind with the way ideas exist in God’s mind: 
“The manner of representation, however, is the manner appropriate to a human idea; and undoubtedly 
God, or some other intelligent nature more perfect than a human mind, could have a much more 
perfect, i.e. more accurate and distinct, idea” (AT VII, 368/CSM II, 253). 
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to make distinctions between the different aspects without obviously violating 
divine simplicity.36 
 
3. Immutable Natures as Forms of Divine Perception 
We have rejected accounts that attempt to identify the ontological status of eternal 
truths and essences with created substances, material or mental. This was primarily 
for ontological reasons, both temporal and structural. Since the material world and 
human minds were created in time, neither can sustain the eternality of essences 
or truths.37 Descartes makes this particularly clear in the case of the human soul, 
which he considers immortal and not eternal. The eternal nature of truths and 
essences pairs with their metaphysical immutability (the products of God’s will are 
absolutely unchanging), which is mirrored by their indivisibility in the mind. This 
symmetrical atomism is also not accounted for on the aforementioned views.38 The 
main objection these authors level against those who wish to situate the eternal 
truths and immutable natures in God is that this dissolves the distinction between 
God and his creatures or else identifies the truths and natures with God’s essence 
(both of which are rejected by Descartes). I wish to propose a solution that 
maintains the eternality and immutability of truths and essences that Descartes 
                                                 
36 Consult Hattab 2016 for a critique of Schmaltz and Rozemond’s neglect of the influence of 
Neoplatonism (particularly Proclus) on Descartes’s view in favor of a reliance on medieval and 
scholastic sources. 
37 Chappell tries awkwardly, and unsuccessfully, to avoid this objection (1997, 126-127). He bites the 
bullet and claims that Descartes did not really think that eternal truths and natures are eternal. 
Chappell’s main worry appears to be infringing on divine simplicity, yet his own position appears to 
imply a rather serious infringement itself. If the knowledge of eternal truths and essences (and of the 
world to be created) does not exist in God’s understanding from eternity, then there is a breach in the 
identity of his will and understanding. God knew from all eternity that he would create the world in 
time, just as he knew that a square has four sides, and none of this had to wait for the actual moment of 
world- or mind-creation. 
38 I should emphasize that this neglect of Descartes’ atomism helps to explain the texts marshaled in 
favor of the interpretations that place the eternal truths and essences in finite substances. My account 
does not deny that truths and essences have existence in minds and matter; however, we must be 
careful about how we understand this existence. Simple, indivisible ideas of eternal truths and 
immutable essences exist in the mind, yet as objective beings they point indelibly toward that which 
they represent. At this point, it appears possible that the representatum could be a materially existing 
object, such as a triangle (à la Cunning); yet if we recognize that the ontological foundation of the 
atomistic nature of our innate idea is something immutable, then it follows that the representatum cannot 
be an existing triangle, which is divisible and mutable. 
22 
 
repeatedly asserted, while avoiding the latter two positions that Descartes 
consistently denied.39 
We can make sense of the fact that eternal truths and essences do have 
objective existence in human minds, and perhaps also formal existence in material 
bodies, by considering a passing remark Descartes makes in response to Hobbes: 
I am taking the word “idea” to refer to whatever is immediately perceived by the mind. 
[...] I used the word “idea” because it was the standard philosophical term used to refer to 
the forms of perception belonging to the divine mind, even though we recognize that God 
does not possess any corporeal imagination. And besides, there was not any more 
appropriate term at my disposal. (AT VII, 181/CSM II, 127-128) 
When Descartes mentions the “standard” philosophical terminology, he is 
referring to the long-standing tradition that understood ideas as exemplars in 
God’s mind. This is the Augustinian reformulation of Platonic Ideas or Forms that 
serve as the perfect models through which God created all things in this world.40 
Unfortunately, Descartes never elaborates on this notion, and we cannot make too 
much out of such an insignificant text. But it does give us a reasonable way of 
understanding how created truths and essences relate to created minds and matter. 
Earlier we demonstrated that eternal truths and essences were created from 
eternity and that this creation existed simultaneously in God’s understanding. We 
are not provided with a fully worked out account of how divine ideas exist in God’s 
                                                 
39 Consider this an attempt to answer De Rosa’s challenge (2011, 619-621), and in particular to reject 
her assertion that for Descartes “the being of essences in God’s mind is not prior to their being in 
human minds” (2011, 620). 
40 One might be skeptical that such a tradition had a direct influence on Descartes. There were, 
however, currents in the scholastic tradition that made use of this Platonic-Augustinian conception in a 
way that looks forward to the more familiar Cartesian ideas. For example, in his Summa, Eustachius a 
Sancto Paulo writes: “What the Greeks call Idea the Latins call Exemplar, which is nothing else but the 
explicit image or species of the thing to be made in the mind of the artificer. Thus the idea or exemplar 
is in this case some image (phantasma) or work of imagination (phantasiae) in the artificer to which the 
external work conforms. And so in the artificer insofar as he is an artificer there are two internal 
principles of operation, namely the art in his mind or reason and the idea or exemplar in his 
imagination (phantasia). Art is a certain disposition, but idea is a certain act or concept represented by 
the mind” (Eustachius 1609, Physics, Part III, disputation I, question III, 54; quoted in Ariew 2014, 
108-109). See Chapter 3 of this latter work (co-written with Marjorie Grene) and Wells 1993 for more 
on this matter. 
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infinite understanding, yet however it is they exist there, they seem to function as 
blueprints for the fashioning of human minds and material objects.41 
Before attempting to clarify Descartes’ view of divine ideas, we must first 
illustrate the philosophical difficulties such a position faces. We can exhibit the 
problem in its most basic form by noting the following Cartesian tenets: (1) God’s 
essence is distinct from his creations, including the eternal truths and immutable 
essences, since he was entirely free to create them; (2) these truths and essences 
are eternally fixed in God’s understanding; and finally, (3) God’s nature is 
absolutely simple. My suggestion is that the eternal truths and essences are created 
by God, and are thus not part of his essence, but must also be understood by God, 
and so exist in his understanding. This appears to violate (3), as one aspect of 
God—his understanding—would be somehow distinct from his essence. 
However, given that Descartes insists on the identification of God’s understanding 
and will, I do not see how it could be any other way. The free choices of God’s 
will, including the creation of the world, cannot be part of his essence (lest they be 
determined), yet are necessarily part of his understanding. However, there is also a 
problem with Descartes’ insistence that for God, “willing, understanding and 
creating are all the same thing without one being prior to the other, even rationally 
[ne quidem ratione]” (AT I, 153/CSMK, 26; translation modified ). This identification 
appears only to account for truths that are the result of God’s will, since truths 
about God’s essence (e.g. his existence) must be known by God, but are not 
created by him. If this is correct, the scope of God’s understanding would surpass 
that of God’s will. 
There is also the issue of the potentially heretical identification of God with 
his creatures. I think this question turns on the solution to divine simplicity for the 
following reasons. Those who think that locating eternal truths and essences in 
God involves identifying creator with creatures have not paid close enough 
attention to the difference between the way that finite material and mental 
substances exist as creatures and the way that truths and essences exist as products 
                                                 
41 This also provides a way of understanding Descartes’ claim in Le Monde that God’s immutability 
implies that laws of nature would be true in any world (AT XI, 47). 
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of God’s will. In the case of existing creatures such as human minds and the 
material world, their being is distinct from God’s being, even though such 
creatures causally depend on God at every moment of their existence. Despite this 
ontological independence, God nevertheless has knowledge of his creatures, which 
exists in his understanding (lest he be ignorant of his own creation). We do not 
think that this knowledge of creation existing in God’s understanding in any way 
involves an identification of creator and creation. As stated above, an important 
component of God’s creation of the world is the divine forms through which the 
particulars of finite existence are fashioned. These are, of course, truths and 
essences of things, which have their eternal abode in God’s understanding. 
Descartes claims that truths and essences are “established” (disposuit) or “made” 
(fecit) in contrast with “the existence of things”, which are “created” (creavit) (AT I, 
152-153/CSM III, 25).42 It would be a much greater sin of heresy to assert that 
truths and essences do not exist in God’s eternal understanding, implying a denial 
of divine omniscience, than it would be to suppose that the products of God’s will 
also exist in his understanding. Therefore, the burden of philosophical coherence 
with Descartes’ position falls almost entirely on the question of divine simplicity, 
rather than on the supposed heresy of identifying creator and creation.43 
The above concerns are challenging rational obstacles for Descartes, but I 
believe he does attempt to address them. There are three considerations that work 
to alleviate this puzzle. First, we must recall Descartes’ understanding of simplicity 
as inseparability of attributes, especially in the case of God. Just as the simplicity 
of a triangle involves the inseparability of its various properties, rather than its 
semantic or formal analyticity, divine simplicity refers to the fact that God’s infinity 
of attributes are impossible to separate. Second, the reason that the human intellect 
is able to coherently discuss God’s various attributes (existence, essence, 
understanding, etc.) is not because these parts are really or modally distinguished, 
                                                 
42 Schmaltz offers a different take on this passage (1991, 136-145), which should also be reviewed. 
43 Add to these comments De Rosa’s keen observation that Descartes does not appear to have a 
nuanced enough theory of distinctions to account for a proper distinction between God and his created 
essences (2011, 618-619). 
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but merely rationally so. Descartes explains the latter distinction as “between a 
substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is 
unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction between two such attributes of a single 
substance” (AT VIII-1, 30/CSM I, 214). With respect to God’s will and 
understanding, there is not even a rational difference, while we can apparently 
make intellectual partitions between divine will/understanding and divine essence, 
for example.44 Finally, it is in these moments, when trying to understand how God 
could have an infinite number of attributes while remaining absolutely simple, that 
Descartes emphasizes the incomprehensibility of God’s power. In the key letters 
to Mersenne of 1630, Descartes variously mentions the following:  
The greatness of God [...] is something which we cannot grasp even though we know it”; 
“In general we can assert that God can do everything that is within our grasp but not that 
he cannot do what is beyond our grasp”; “God as a being who is infinite and beyond our 
grasp”; “God is a cause whose power surpasses the bounds of human understanding”; 
“the incomprehensible power of God”; “God is infinite and all powerful.” (AT I, 145-
152/CSMK, 23-25) 
Descartes repeatedly affirms the infinite power of God in these passages in 
order to reinforce the point that although we cannot fathom how mathematical 
truths could be any other way, God was free to make them otherwise. We try to 
understand how God could have made a triangle’s angles add to more than two 
right angles and fail to do so.45 
What conclusion can we draw from the above texts? We have thus far 
attempted to demonstrate that the eternal truths and immutable natures must exist 
as “forms of perception” in God’s eternal understanding. When we then try to 
ascertain precisely how these divine forms exist, Descartes appeals to God’s 
                                                 
44 I do not think that one should rely too heavily on the controversial Conversation with Burman, but 
the remarks at AT V, 165-166 support my interpretation of this point. 
45 This juxtaposition of the weakness of human understanding in the face of God’s incomprehensible 
power is not limited to the early letters. In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes writes that given God’s 
nature as “immense, incomprehensible and infinite [...] he is capable of countless things whose causes 
are beyond my knowledge” (AT VII, 55/CSM II, 39). Likewise, in the Principles, where Descartes claims 
that “there is much, both in the immeasurable nature of God and in the things created by him, which is 
beyond our mental capacity” (AT VIII-1, 14/CSM I, 201). It should be noted that the topic of divine 
simplicity is incredibly complex, and as the focus of this paper has been on atoms of thought and 
immutable natures, I do not pretend to have solved this issue. 
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incomprehensible power to achieve an inseparability of infinite attributes.46 This is 
the reason we earlier rejected attempts to specify the nature of the eternal truths 
and natures as either “weak attributes” of God or objective ideas in God’s mind, 
both of which imply some form of imperfection. Descartes does not use this 
language, and does not try to devise a sophisticated schematic for the apparatus of 
the divine understanding. This should not be surprising, as the structure of the 
finite human mind is vastly different from the constitution of the infinite mind. 
Therefore, in response to the question—how do eternal truths and essences 
exist in God?—we can only say the following, as derived from our earlier analysis. 
The eternal truths and immutable essences have been wrought eternally from 
God’s immutable will. As God’s will and understanding are identical, and there can 
be no doubt that God understands his own creative acts for all eternity, truths and 
essences exist as immutable beings in God’s mind. Their metaphysical nature is 
such that their meanings can in no way be altered or divided. God has decreed 
each of them to have various properties that are inseparably bound and this 
unbreakable metaphysical nature of the eternal truths and immutable essences 
gives rise to their privileged status as atoms of thought in human minds. Our minds 
have been fashioned such that we necessarily have a clear and distinct perception 
every time we alight upon these natures. We are unable to divide or change these 
atoms of thought, and are forced to recognize their independent existence. The 
objective content of such ideas indicates the unwavering formal reality that our 
ideas represent. 
                                                 
46 Nolan appeals to God’s incomprehensibility in order to explain how truths and natures existing in 
human minds can be eternal (1997, 184-186). This appears as a last ditch attempt to resolve one of the 
fundamental problems I have emphasized with his interpretation (the eternality of truths and natures). 
Why can the same not be said of my own appeal? In the texts I have offered as evidence, Descartes 
specifically addresses the problem of divine simplicity by deferring to God’s incomprehensibility. In all 
of these texts, it is God’s nature itself (as both simple and infinite) that presents us with his sheer power 
and corresponding incomprehensibility. Descartes never states that the issue of the eternality of truths 
and natures (existing as objective ideas in human minds) is solved by God’s incomprehensibility 
because eternality is simply not a problem if truths and essences reside in God’s understanding. When 
Descartes comes face to face with a real tension in his views, such as the reconciliation of God’s 
preordination and our free will, he makes very specific reference to incomprehensibility (AT VIII-1, 
20), reference that Nolan fails to provide. Nonetheless, Descartes’ repeated reliance on this strategy is 
not without its intrinsic difficulties, as I shall discuss below. 
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Is Descartes’ solution to the puzzle about immutable natures and eternal 
truths satisfactory? Ultimately it would be hard to convince the modern reader that 
this is so. When Descartes resolves the difficult tensions in his philosophy by 
invoking notions that are, in principle, beyond human reason, it would appear that 
he is engaging in something akin to the speculations of theology that he had 
promised to avoid. However, as nearly all of the problems with Descartes’ account 
of eternal truths and essences involve determining the nature of divine simplicity, 
is his view any worse off than those of the countless medieval, scholastic, and early 
modern thinkers who faced the same problem? If anything, Descartes has at least 
offered a relatively plausible account of simplicity as inseparability of attributes that 
avoids immediate paradox. Some recent commentators have tried to make 
Descartes’ philosophy (particularly his epistemology) more palatable to 
contemporary taste by emphasizing that the tenor of his work is closer to our own 
time than to the dominant Christian worldview of his predecessors.47 To do so is 
to miss Descartes’ justification for the atomism of thought, which has its 
foundation in God’s immeasurable power. Today’s proponents of various 
ungrounded forms of conceptual and linguistic atomism might even learn from 
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